Photo: Raffles London at The OWO. Brand Atlas4 September 2026 ·4 min read

Every sales suite in the category quotes the launch premium. Almost none quote resale evidence, for the simple reason that most branded schemes are too young to have produced a meaningful second-hand market. This piece sets out what can honestly be said.
Three structural problems limit the data. Branded schemes are recent — the majority of global stock has been delivered since 2015, so few have traded through a full cycle. Comparable sets are narrow: in most cities there is no genuinely equivalent unbranded building on the same street with the same specification. And transaction disclosure varies enormously by jurisdiction, with several of the largest branded markets publishing no unit-level price data at all.
Anyone quoting a precise global resale premium is extrapolating. The honest position is a range with conditions attached.
| Market condition | Observed resale behaviour | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Mature branded market, brand retained, strong location | Premium persists at roughly 15–30% | Moderate |
| Brand retained, service standards slipped | Premium compresses to under 10% | Moderate |
| Heavy new branded supply in the same submarket | Premium compresses; older schemes discount | Moderate |
| Brand exited (de-branded) | Premium largely lost within 24 months | Low — few cases |
| Weak underlying location | Premium never materialises at resale | Moderate |
The premium attaches to the operating platform far more than to the name. Schemes where the brand supplies staffing, training and audit hold value; schemes where it supplied a logo and a design manual converge on unbranded pricing within a decade.
This is the most under-appreciated variable, and it is decided by the service charge. Owners' associations that vote down budgets to save money are, in effect, voting down their own resale price. The savings are annual and small; the value loss is capital and large.
In markets where branded stock has gone from scarce to abundant — parts of Dubai, Miami and Bangkok — the marginal value of "branded" as a category has fallen even where individual schemes have performed well. Territorial exclusivity in the original licence is worth a great deal here.
The uncomfortable finding across our work: branded schemes in genuinely prime locations hold value, and branded schemes in secondary locations do not, largely independent of the brand. The brand accelerates and amplifies; it does not substitute for the fundamentals.
Beyond the headline premium, branded stock shows two consistent advantages in weak markets. Liquidity: branded units transact in downturns when comparable unbranded stock does not, because the buyer pool is international and the product is legible at distance. Volatility: peak-to-trough falls tend to be shallower, with the brand providing a demand floor. Both effects are more reliable than the premium itself.
Resale performance is a marketing asset and it is built, not claimed. The schemes that will command a resale premium in 2035 are the ones being properly funded operationally in 2026 — realistic service-charge budgets, funded reserves, an operator with genuine exposure, and territorial exclusivity that prevents the sponsor competing with itself.
Generally better than comparable unbranded stock, but not automatically. Where the brand still operates the building, service standards have held and the location was genuinely prime, resale premiums of roughly 15–30% persist. Where any of those fail, the premium compresses sharply.
Usually not. Launch premiums cluster at 25–40%; observed resale premiums are lower and more variable. A prudent buyer underwrites on the assumption that the premium roughly halves by the time they sell.
Most global branded stock has been delivered since 2015, so few schemes have traded through a full cycle. Comparable unbranded sets are narrow, and several of the largest branded markets publish no unit-level transaction data, which makes precise global figures unreliable.
A decline in service standards, usually caused by an owners' association underfunding the operating budget, followed by heavy competing branded supply in the same submarket and, in rare cases, loss of the brand itself.
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